Regional sanctions against Burundi: the regime's argumentative self-entrapment by Grauvogel, Julia
www.ssoar.info
Regional sanctions against Burundi: the regime's
argumentative self-entrapment
Grauvogel, Julia
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz
frei zugänglich. / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and
a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Grauvogel, J. (2015). Regional sanctions against Burundi: the regime's argumentative self-entrapment. The Journal of
Modern African Studies, 53(2), 169-191. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X15000324
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-437294
The Journal of Modern African
Studies
http://journals.cambridge.org/MOA
Additional services for The Journal of Modern
African Studies:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
Regional sanctions against Burundi: the regime's
argumentative self-entrapment
Julia Grauvogel
The Journal of Modern African Studies / Volume 53 / Issue 02 / June 2015, pp 169 - 191
DOI: 10.1017/S0022278X15000324, Published online: 20 May 2015
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022278X15000324
How to cite this article:
Julia Grauvogel (2015). Regional sanctions against Burundi: the regime's
argumentative self-entrapment. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 53, pp
169-191 doi:10.1017/S0022278X15000324
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/MOA, IP address: 213.39.242.4 on 30 Jun 2015
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 30 Jun 2015 IP address: 213.39.242.4
Regional sanctions against
Burundi: the regime’s
argumentative self-entrapment*
JULIA GRAUVOGEL
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of African
Affairs, Neuer Jungfernstieg ,  Hamburg, Germany
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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines the impact of regional sanctions on the trajectory of the
Burundian regime following the  coup. Despite the country’s socioeco-
nomic and geopolitical vulnerability, the Buyoya government initially withstood
the pressure from sanctions. Through a vocal campaign against these measures,
the new government mitigated the embargo’s economic consequences and
partially re-established its international reputation. Paradoxically, this campaign
planted the seed for long-term comprehensive political concessions. While
previous literature has attributed the embargo’s success to its economic
impact, the government actually responded to the sanction senders’ key
demand to engage in unconditional, inclusive peace talks once the economy
had already started to recover. Based on a novel framework for studying the sig-
nalling dimension of sanctions, I show how the regime’s anti-sanctions cam-
paign, with its emphasis on the government’s willingness to engage in peace
talks, backﬁred, with Buyoya forced to negotiate after having become entrapped
in his own rhetoric.
* This paper is a product of the GIGA research project ‘Ineffective Sanctions? External
Sanctions and the Persistence of Autocratic Regimes’, which is funded by the Fritz Thyssen
Foundation (grant number: ···). I would like to thank Michael Brzoska,
Ntagahoraho Burihabwa, Gordon Crawford, Sinja Hantscher, Christian von Soest and the
two anonymous reviewers as well as the participants of the doctoral colloquium at the
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg and of the research colloquium
of the Chair for Global Governance at the University of Münster led by Markus Lederer for
their insightful comments and constructive criticism.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
With his successful coup d’état on  July , the former Burundian
president Pierre Buyoya brought the ongoing regional mediation efforts
to a standstill. After the military takeover, violence increased in the
second half of : the number of battle-related casualties and
refugees rose, and the ﬁghting spread geographically (Hoskins et al.
; Ngaruko & Nkurunziza : –; UCDP ). The neigh-
bouring countries reacted swiftly and agreed to ‘exert maximum
pressure on the regime in Bujumbura including the imposition of econ-
omic sanctions’ (Second Regional Summit on the Burundi Conﬂict
). They demanded the immediate restoration of Burundi’s
National Assembly and the reinstatement of political parties as well as
peace negotiations. Simultaneously, the international donors froze all
assistance other than emergency aid.
The subsequent unfolding of the sanctions episode against Burundi
was characterised by two seemingly contradictory developments: On
the one hand, the regime resisted the external coercion, to the surprise
of the sanction senders, who, given Burundi’s economic and geopolitical
vulnerability, had expected to quickly force Buyoya into negotiations.
The embargo’s initial effect on Burundi was indeed harsh; it further
paralysed the already war-torn economy (Khadiagala ; Kamungi
et al. ). This raises the question of how the Buyoya government
managed to withstand the pressure of one of the most comprehensive
sanction regimes since the end of the Cold War. In addition to sanc-
tion-busting activities, the regime launched a vocal campaign against
the sanctions that () helped it to lobby for exemptions, () contributed
to it regaining some international legitimacy so that the international
donor community renewed its engagement, and () shifted the blame
for economic problems to the embargo.
On the other hand, Buyoya eventually engaged in the kind of region-
ally mediated unconditional negotiations with all parties to the conﬂict
that he had previously rejected. According to the assessment of several
scholars, the sanctions contributed signiﬁcantly to reviving the peace
process because of their severe economic consequences (Ndikumana
; Lemarchand : ; Maundi : ). However, the fact
that the regime agreed to the Arusha negotiations when the sanctions’
economic impact had withered casts doubt on this interpretation. This
paper argues that the controversies surrounding the sanctions shaped
political contestation between the Buyoya government and the political
opposition beyond the embargo’s mere ﬁnancial effect. The Buyoya
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government became argumentatively ‘self-entrapped’ in its own diplo-
matic campaign against the sanctions, which stressed the government’s
willingness to engage in peace talks. This paradox underscores the need
to go beyond the assessment of how costly sanctions coerce regimes into
compliance and to seriously examine their signalling dimension. Against
the backdrop of the embargo’s severe economic consequences, the sanc-
tions against Burundi serve as a ‘critical case’ (Flyvbjerg : ) with
which to explore the importance of the signals sent by sanctions.
The paper’s ﬁndings are based on  semi-structured interviews with
diplomats, policy-makers, military personnel and journalists conducted
in Burundi in August and September . These interviews were
crucial to understanding the respective actors’ perceptions of sanctions
as guiding their responses to the regional and international pressure.
Press releases from political parties and sympathiser groups as well as
ofﬁcial documents collected in Burundi were used to supplement the
analysis whenever they were available. Although the sanctions were
imposed on Burundi during the late s, they still constitute an inte-
gral part of the country’s (diverse) contemporary historical narrative(s)
and were thus remembered by all interviewees in great detail. Moreover,
former political elites who are no longer in ofﬁce were able to speak
more openly about past events than they could have done at the time
the sanctions were in place (see also Vorrath ).
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. The ﬁrst section
sketches limitations of the conventional sanctions literature with its
emphasis on economic coercion and proposes an alternative framework
that focuses on signalling, symbolic and political aspects of sanctions.
The next section explores how the Buyoya regime initially withstood
the economic pressure of the embargo with an aggressive and fairly suc-
cessful anti-sanctions campaign but then became increasingly self-
entrapped in the campaign’s rhetoric. Finally, the conclusion discusses
the ﬁndings in light of past studies on the embargo against Burundi
and the current research on sanctions more generally.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L S A N C T I O N S : E C O N O M I C C O E R C I O N O R
P O W E R F U L S I G N A L S ?
Traditional approaches suggest that the purpose of sanctions is ‘to bring
about policy change in the targeted nation through imposing the sever-
est possible economic harm’ (Kaempfer & Lowenberg : ; see
also Barber ; Doxey ). The economic pain inﬂicted upon
R E G I O N A L S A N C T I O N S A G A I N S T B U R U N D I
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the target has indeed been identiﬁed as one of the most reliable predic-
tors of sanctions success. Hufbauer et al. (: –) found that high
costs to the target – operationalised as a percentage of the GNP – are
positively correlated with sanctions effectiveness, which was repeatedly
conﬁrmed in subsequent large-N research (Drury ; Morgan &
Schwebach ; Nooruddin ; for a diverging ﬁnding, see
Tsebelis ). In an attempt to quantify the impact of the ﬁnancial con-
sequences on sanctions success, Morgan et al. () estimate the
success rate of sanctions, which stands at  per cent when costs
are minor, to increase to  per cent when the costs to the target are
severe. Likewise, Allen () shows that comprehensive sanctions
reduce the time period after which the target concedes compared
with less severe measures. Further specifying these insights, scholars
argue that the economic leverage of the sender rather than the cost to
the target as such increases the effectiveness of sanctions (Dizaji & van
Bergeijk ). In that context, the degree to which a target previously
relied on the sanctions sender for imports appears to affect its vulner-
ability (Dashti-Gibson et al. ; Hart ). In contrast, third-party
assistance from so-called black knights reduces the exposure to external
pressure (Hufbauer et al. : –; see also Drury ; Early ;
McLean & Whang ). Finally, economically health targets are less
susceptible to international sanctions (Drury ; Jing et al. ).
Two mechanisms of how costly sanctions induce a target to change its
policies can be discerned. On the one hand, higher costs place stronger
pressure on the target’s government (inter alia Dashti-Gibson et al. ;
Hart ; Dizaji & van Bergeijk ). If leaders of the targeted regime
act on the basis of rational cost-beneﬁt analyses, they should ‘ﬁnd it
harder to justify resisting the sender’s pressure as the costs of the sanc-
tion go up’ (Nooruddin : ; see also McGillivray & Stam ).
One the other hand, the economic harm caused by severe sanctions is
thought to bring about political disintegration because the targeted
society is only willing to bear the ﬁnancial damage up to a certain level
(Kerr & Gaisford ). Recent approaches argue that the costs
imposed on a country’s ruling coalition rather than the overall econ-
omic consequences are crucial, particularly in non-democratic regimes
(Lektzian & Souva ; Escribà-Folch & Wright ).
In a nutshell, this research can be summarised as follows: When sanc-
tions work, this should be attributable to the economic pain inﬂicted
upon the target. Furthermore, sanctions should be most effective
when they hurt key support groups. In other words, if targeted
regimes, especially authoritarian ones, manage to protect their
 J U L I A G R A U V O G E L
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selectorate from ﬁnancial damage (Bolks & Al-Sowayel ; Escribà-
Folch & Wright ), they should be able to resist the pressure from
sanctions.
When the sanctions against Burundi were implemented, the Regional
Initiative’s expectation was indeed that, given Burundi’s economic vul-
nerability, the weight of the embargo would force the government to
resume the type of unconditional negotiations they demanded
(Khadiagala : ; Khadiagala : –). Most scholars
agree that sanctions ultimately played a major role in pressuring the
Buyoya government into the Arusha negotiations due to their severe
costs. Ndikumana (: ) exemplarily attributes the sanctions’
success to ‘mounting domestic frustration with deteriorating economic
conditions’ (see also Lemarchand : ; Maundi : ).
However, the regime initially managed to withstand the embargo’s econ-
omic pressure with the help of an anti-sanctions campaign that has been
characterised as highly dynamic, aggressive and fairly effective (Bunting
et al. ). The regime’s crucial supporters, particularly urban busi-
nessmen and (former) high-ranking civil servants, were shielded from
the costs of sanctions or even proﬁted from the opaqueness surrounding
the trade of now scarce resources (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza ).
Despite its ability to adapt to the economic constraints set by the
embargo, the government eventually responded to the sanction
senders’ key demand to engage in unconditional, inclusive and region-
ally mediated peace talks. Hoskins et al. (: ) hypothesise that the
‘progress eventually made may be connected less to economic sanctions
than to Burundi’s isolation from the international community’. In a
similar manner, Khadiagala (: ) stresses that sanctions not
only affected the regime economically but also signalled disapproval
of the coup and thereby denied the new government legitimacy
without, however, spelling out how this development contributed to
bringing about the regime’s concessions.
Another strand of research, which has developedmostly in isolation of
the quantitative studies’ emphasis on the ﬁnancial pain inﬂicted upon
the targets, highlights that sanctions also serve the function of expres-
sing the senders’ (moral) disapproval of the targeted regime (Galtung
; Lindsay ; Nossal ). This signalling impact of sanctions
has recently received revived attention (Crawford & Klotz ; Grebe
; Grauvogel & von Soest ). In addition to coercing a target
into compliance or constraining it, sanctions send a message to targets
and audiences (Giumelli , ). However, both past and
current accounts of sanctions symbolism are based on a problematic
R E G I O N A L S A N C T I O N S A G A I N S T B U R U N D I
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distinction between instrumental and signalling purposes of sanctions
(inter alia Lindsay ; Morgan & Schwebach ; for an early
critique, see Baldwin : ). Going beyond this dichotomy, Lopez
& Cortright (: , emphasis added) argue in pointed terms that
‘the symbolic or signaling purposes of sanctions may be less measurable
(…), but they can be important to achieving the sender’s goals’. In other
words, the signals conveyed by sanctions may also contribute to the
target’s behavioural change. This potential mechanism of how sanctions
work has not yet been sufﬁciently explored. In the following, I propose a
framework for exploring how messages sent by sanctions may result in
concessions by the targeted regime that draws on the notion of argu-
mentative self-entrapment.
Such an ‘argumentative self-entrapment’ (Risse : ) occurs
when states that are facing international criticism and demands to act
in line with certain norms begin ‘talking the talk’, meaning that they dis-
cursively comply with an internationally backed and promoted discourse
of democratic governance. Governments confronted with international
pressure as a result of norm-violating behaviour initially tend to increase
domestic repression and deny the validity of international claims while
stressing national sovereignty to discourage international interference.
When the pressure mounts, national governments adjust strategically
to (re-)gain access to foreign aid and secure their rule vis-à-vis domestic
opposition movements – for example, by making limited concessions to
those advocating better protection of human rights and democratic gov-
ernance (Risse & Sikkink : ). Tactical commitments to human
rights and democracy initially appear to be a low-cost strategy for
responding to criticism, especially ‘for repressive states that come
under close scrutiny’ (Hafner-Burton et al. : ). Accordingly,
many states exhibit a certain degree of norm-conforming rhetoric or be-
haviour in order to silence demands for real change (Hathaway ).
However, limited concessions have been found to trigger develop-
ments that ultimately induce the governments to offer changes in behav-
iour from which they then ﬁnd it hard to extricate themselves (Risse &
Sikkink ). A state that ‘faces (actual or potential) sanctions and
suffers a process of ‘shaming’ in which norm-violating states are por-
trayed as “pariah states”’ is increasingly forced to justify its behaviour
in front of international and domestic audiences (Muñoz : ).
When norm-violating governments accept the norms rhetorically in
order to decrease the international and domestic pressure on them,
they embark upon a process in which they are measured against their
verbal concessions at later stages. Instrumental commitments then
 J U L I A G R A U V O G E L
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backﬁre because domestic or international actors are able to hold them
accountable, especially when the governments no longer deny the val-
idity of the international demands per se, but rather claim that inter-
national actors misinterpret the domestic situation and hence engage
in a public debate regarding the latters’ critiques. Superﬁcial commit-
ments may translate into profound concessions over time when initial
reforms spark further demands for change (Goodman & Jinks ),
especially if such reforms are interpreted as a partial success by opposi-
tion groups, which strengthens them and motivates additional demands
(McAdam ).
T H E R E G I O N A L E M B A R G O A G A I N S T B U R U N D I
The struggle surrounding the sanctions against Burundi was shaped by
long-standing internal and regional dynamics. From  to 
Burundi was governed by three military regimes under the unitary
party Union pour le Progrès national (UPRONA, Union for National
Progress). The ruling elite, composed exclusively of the Tutsi ethnic
minority, repressed its citizens to sustain its grip on power (Uvin
). After another violent outbreak against the Hutus in , the
international community increased pressure on the then-president
Buyoya, who eventually paved the way for the introduction of a multi-
party system in the early s (Laely ; Ngaruko & Nkurunziza
).
After losing the  elections, which were widely praised as free and
fair, Buyoya accepted defeat and ceded power to Melchior Ndadaye, the
candidate of the major opposition party, Front pour la Démocratie au
Burundi (FRODEBU, Front for Democracy in Burundi) (Young
). The new government made attempts at coalition and conﬁdence
building with the former ruling elite (Reyntjens ; Lemarchand
; Sullivan ), but also initiated the ‘Frodebisation’ of the civil
service (Reyntjens : ) and promoted the redistribution of
national resources (Reyntjens : ) as well as the return of Hutu
refugees (Prunier ), thereby creating anxiety among the Tutsi
population.
Moreover, the transition process was undermined by the former elite’s
continued control over the army, which became an important veto
player in domestic politics and hampered democratic gains (Reyntjens
; Lemarchand ; Bratton & van de Walle ). After the elec-
tions, elements of the armed forces assassinated President Ndadaye on
 October . These events resulted in a ‘creeping coup’
R E G I O N A L S A N C T I O N S A G A I N S T B U R U N D I
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(Reyntjens : ), which de facto shifted power back into the hands
of the military. Subsequently, the new Hutu-dominated rebel move-
ments Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD,
National Council for the Defence of Democracy) and its armed wing
Front pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD, Front for the Defence
of Democracy) as well as the Union pour la liberation nationale
(ULINA) were created in  and , respectively, and existing
groups renewed their activity (Ndikumana ).
In reaction to this conﬂict and the accompanying threat to the region’s
stability, thepresidents ofRwanda,Uganda,Tanzania andZaire launched
the ‘Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative for a negotiated peace in
Burundi’ (henceforth, Regional Initiative) in November  and
appointed the former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere as mediator.
At the same time, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali proposed the
deployment of a standby force of , soldiers in Burundi (Dupont
). This proposal was turned down on  March  by the UN
Security Council in Resolution , which expressed preference for
regionally led peace efforts (Neethling ). In June and July , the
regional mediation culminated in a series of summits, which advocated a
negotiated settlement and national reconciliation but also considered
implementing an arms embargo and visa bans for those undermining the
peace process (Daley ). The situation in Burundi escalated when
President Ntibantunganya, fearing a military takeover of power, ﬂed to
the US embassy (New York Times ..). On  July , the army
installed Buyoya in a bloodless coup d’état (Nsanze : ).
Only six days after the coup, the heads of state of Ethiopia, Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia as well as Secretary-
General Salim Ahmed Salim of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) met in Arusha. Using the framework of the Regional Initiative,
they strongly condemned the coup and imposed sanctions to achieve
a return to constitutional order and ‘immediate and unconditional
negotiations with all parties to the conﬂict’ (Second Regional Summit
on the Burundi Conﬂict ). Nyerere, who had already suggested
sanctions against Burundi before the coup and felt that the military take-
over had undermined his mediation efforts, forcefully articulated the
pro-sanctions case (Wolpe ). The regional leaders afﬁrmed his
approach as they feared a further spill over of the conﬂict, which had
already led to an inﬂux of Burundian refugees to the neighbouring
countries (Nimubona : ). In addition, most heads of state had
grown impatient with the former (Tutsi) elite’s reliance on unconstitu-
tional means to hold on to power (Wolpe ). A regional sanctions
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coordinating committee (RSCC) was established to monitor the sanc-
tions’ effects and humanitarian impact (ReliefWeb ).
The international community at ﬁrst supported the Regional
Initiative. In line with preceding international endorsements of the
regional attempts to address the crisis in Burundi, the UN Security
Council adopted a resolution on  August  that welcomed the
regional peace endeavours (UN Security Council ). Western gov-
ernments also condemned the coup d’état and initially supported the
sanctions (Prunier : ). US Department of State spokesman
Nicholas Burns stressed that his government would ‘work to isolate
any government that emerges in Bujumbura by extra-constitutional
means’ (Inter Press Service ..). Accordingly, the United States
refused to recognise the new government and suspended bilateral assist-
ance (Lomasney &Halperin ). Likewise, the EU expressed ‘support
for the regional leaders’ (European Union ) and cancelled its
ﬁnancial assistance to the post-coup government (Ngaruko &
Nkurunziza : –). This stance was still maintained at the begin-
ning of , when the EU envoy to the Great Lakes region, Aldo Ajello,
told reporters after a meeting with Buyoya that ‘the behaviour of the
authorities in Burundi had not encouraged the international commu-
nity to remove the sanctions’ (ReliefWeb ).
Burundi’s geographic location, its close economic ties with those who
implemented the embargo and its dependency on bi- and multilateral
aid magniﬁed the sanctions’ economic impact. Being landlocked,
Burundi exported and imported most goods through the port of the
Tanzanian capital Dar es Salaam and, to a lesser extent, through the
Kenyan port of Mombasa. Furthermore, Burundi depended heavily on
ofﬁcial development assistance, which accounted for almost % of its
gross national income in the three years preceding the sanctions (World
Bank ). Dwindling revenues from the blocked export of Burundi’s
major cash crops, coffee and tea, additionally limited the government’s
ﬁnancial room for manoeuvre (Banque de la République du Burundi
). According to a survey carried out in the capital Bujumbura, the
cost of living rose ‘alarmingly […] due to the economic blockade’
(Banque de la République du Burundi : ). The sanctions and the
ongoing civil war led to a % increase in the general price index during
the ﬁrst year after their imposition (Kamungi et al. ). However, the
sanctions’ economic impact did not trigger large-scale protest against
the Burundian government as anticipated by the sanction senders and
the domestic opposition (Ndayisaba  int.) nor did the ﬁnancial
pain cause the government to yield to the senders’ demands at ﬁrst.
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Withstanding Costly Sanctions
The regime launched a campaign against the embargo that targeted
both domestic constituencies and the international community. The
Committee for the Defence of Economic and Social Interests
(CODIES –Comité pour la Défense des Intérêts Économiques et
Sociaux), which comprised crucial economic actors including the
Chamber of Commerce, the Belgian-Burundian and Franco-
Burundian chambers of trade, various unions, and the Association of
Burundian Banks, initiated and coordinated a number of activities. A
press agency was created to inform the national and international
public ‘about […] the new government’s objectives’ as well as the disas-
trous effects of the embargo (Comité pour la Défense des Intérêts
Économiques et Sociaux ). The CODIES also discussed ﬁling a
case before the International Court of Justice and presenting ofﬁcial
complaints at the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organiz-
ation. To support these efforts, the staff at the permanent missions in
Geneva, New York and Brussels should be expanded and provided
with argumentative guidelines (Chambre de Commerce d’Industrie,
d’Agriculture et d’Artisanat du Burundi ). Domestically, the new
government denounced the sanctions as an unjust punishment
and appealed to the Burundians’ national solidarity and pride.
For example, it deﬁantly nicknamed a new boulevard constructed in
the capital during this period ‘Avenue de l’embargo’ (Buyoya 
int.).
The campaign against the sanctions put forth two major arguments:
First, the process of deciding and implementing the embargo was con-
demned as a breach of international law because ‘only the United
Nations can impose sanctions’ (Mbonimpa  int.). According to
this reading, the sanctions constituted an exclusively Tanzanian initiat-
ive, which allegedly pursued a secret agenda of weakening ‘the proud
and ancient nation of Burundi’ (Nyamoya ). Nyerere’s dispropor-
tionate engagement for the FRODEBU and the perception that he
was using the sanctions to bring Buyoya back not to the peace process
in general but speciﬁcally to his regional negotiation table in Arusha
attracted major criticism (Peterson ; Daley ). Consequently,
the Buyoya government refused to accept Nyerere as the mediator
(Mthembu-Salter ). By shifting the blame for the imposition of
sanctions to Tanzania and to Nyerere’s desire to punish the post-coup
government for interrupting his mediation efforts, Buyoya made sure
that his core constituencies – namely, the army and the urban Tutsi
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elite – blamed them rather than his coup for the sanctions (Economist
Intelligence Unit ).
In response, the Regional Initiative sought the Western governments’
support to demonstrate the broad international approval of the
embargo (ReliefWeb ; Second Regional Summit on the Burundi
Conﬂict ). Likewise, FRODEBU activists and other proponents of
the embargo stressed its genuinely regional nature (Bamvuginyumvira
 int.; Ndorimana  int.; Ngendahayo  int.) and the fact
that ‘the region could not have taken the decision [to impose sanctions]
without the support of the United Nations’ (Mbonerane  int.).
Second, the regime stressed the humanitarian impact of the sanctions.
According to the government, the sanctions disproportionately hit the
poor, leading to a ‘shortage of essential elements for the[ir] survival’
(Banyiyezako  int.). The campaign also emphasised the embargo’s
impact on the broader population, stressing that ‘FRODEBU claimed to
represent eighty per cent, but these eighty per cent were suffering from
sanctions’ (Ntahuga  int.). In line with this strategy, a state-
controlled NGO, the Association for the Preservation of Peace in
Burundi, ﬁled a case before the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights denouncing the sanctions’ lack of proportionality
(Olinga ). In addition, sanctions were made responsible for all
economic and social difﬁculties in an attempt to divert attention away
from the regime’s own mismanagement (Hoskins et al. ), a military
budget that absorbed about half of the government’s revenues and the
disastrous effects of the civil war (Economist Intelligence Unit ).
The government campaign regarding the humanitarian impact of
sanctions was increasingly echoed by NGOs and UN agencies. Despite
exemptions for the import of humanitarian goods, the embargo compli-
cated their work and turned them into key players in the anti-sanctions
discourse (Bruderlein ; Khadiagala : ). In response to the
growing concern about the humanitarian impact of sanctions, the RSCC
created a list of humanitarian exemptions on  October 
(Regional Sanctions Coordination Committee ). On  April
, further items were added to the list (Hoskins et al. ).
Moreover, multilateral assistance continued to a certain extent. The
World Bank channelled its funds through domestic NGOs such as
Twitezimbere (Nyandwi  int.), and many programmes ofﬁcially
shifted their focus towards emergency assistance in order to continue
their work (Nduwimana  int.). Furthermore, Western governments
began to voice doubts about the embargo’s ability to positively affect the
situation in Burundi (Daley ; Wolpe ). As one of the ﬁrst
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European countries, France supported Buyoya in demanding that
regional actors should lift the embargo (Cornwell & de Beer ;
Manirakiza : –) and by mid-, the UN, the EU and the
US also suggested that the sanctions should be reconsidered
(Mthembu-Salter ).
In addition to ofﬁcially granted exemptions, the increase in sanction-
busting activity played a major role in reducing the economic impact of
the sanctions. Air corridors were established between Bujumbura and
other African countries, as well as Belgium, with the help of the govern-
ment, which endowed Air Burundi with the exclusive right to explore
the possibilities for the regular transport of commodities and passengers
(Bulletin Ofﬁciel du Burundi a). These air corridors were sup-
plemented by a signiﬁcant amount of cross-border smuggling with
neighbouring countries (Hoskins et al. ; Mthembu-Salter ).
Additionally, Burundi continued its trade with non-COMESA
(Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) states, so that vir-
tually all goods were available again by , albeit at higher prices
(IRIN a). Due to insufﬁcient capacity, as well as an increasing
lack of political will of some countries, the RSCC did not efﬁciently
monitor let alone enforce the sanctions regime (International Crisis
Group ). Commercial activity between Nairobi and Bujumbura
was resumed in July  following the granting of permission by the
Kenyan government (ReliefWeb ), and Eritrea restarted trade
with Burundi in the same year (Bentley & Southall ; Khadiagala
). The readiness to enforce the remaining sanctions further
decreased when a decision by the regional foreign ministers to end
the sanctions was overruled at a meeting of the regional heads of state
in Kampala, Uganda, on  February  in an opaque process.
According to the rumours, the decision was only taken when those
heads of state critical of the embargo had already left (Wohlgemuth
: ).
The Burundian government also used the scarcity of goods to its own
advantage. The disruption of the economy and the widespread smug-
gling resulting from sanctions facilitated the restoration of clientelist
networks among ‘urban businessmen [who] were more affected than
the general population’ (Bihute  int.). Like the leaders of the
two preceding military regimes, Buyoya had made use of extensive
patronage networks during his ﬁrst rule from  to  (Uvin
). After , many of the private ﬁrms that belonged to
(former) high-ranking civil servants (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza )
beneﬁted from sanction-busting activities. Speculative importers
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included senior members of the military and the civil service, and some
evidence also points to the involvement of cabinet ministers (Economist
Intelligence Unit ). Local businessmen, who were generally suppor-
tive of the Buyoya government, also proﬁted from the clandestine trade
(Calmeyn et al. : ; Daley ).
Lastly, the regime managed to adapt to the economic constraints set
by the embargo. The ‘café-carburant’ (coffee for fuel) initiative was
launched to secure the supply of petrol and the export of Burundi’s
most important source of foreign revenues. Moreover, a ‘solidarity
fund’ was set up to generate alternative revenues for the regime’s war
efforts in the face of foreign exchange shortages (Buyoya : ).
The Central Bank created a list of prioritised items to be pursued with
the limited amount of foreign exchange available (Banque de la
République du Burundi : ). This list was later amended to
include selected enterprises of national interest such as the fuel-
trading Société Interpetrol (Bulletin Ofﬁciel du Burundi b).
Private banks were obligated to transfer all remaining foreign exchange
to the Central Bank (Banque de la République du Burundi : ).
Finally, the serving of external debt was suspended in response to the
growing budget deﬁcit (Girukwigomba  int.).
The Buyoya regime managed to reduce the economic pain caused by
the sanctions, so that the economy slowly recovered. After the nation’s
GDP decreased sharply in  due to the sanctions and the civil war,
it remained stagnant in  and grew by ·% in the following year
(Hoskins et al. ; Kamungi et al. ). In a nutshell, economic devel-
opment ‘improved notably as regards internal production and public
ﬁnances and […] inﬂation decreased remarkably thanks to the
regular provision of goods of primary necessity’ (Banque de la
République du Burundi : X).
Argumentative Self-Entrapment
Despite this economic recovery, the regime ultimately responded to the
Regional Initiative’s most important requirement for the lifting of sanc-
tions: unconditional negotiations with all parties to the conﬂict. At ﬁrst,
the regime denied that its seizure of power could be characterised as a
coup and argued that the sanctions thus lacked any well-founded
reason. The toughness of the sanctions took Buyoya and his supporters,
who had relied on Buyoya’s international reputation for having paved
the way to multiparty democracy, by surprise (Uvin ). This standing
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was undermined by the signals of regime disapproval conveyed by the
sanctions: The Regional Initiative referred to the new government
as the ‘Buyoya regime’ rather than talking about the Burundian govern-
ment (Second Regional Summit on the Burundi Conﬂict ;
Sixth Regional Summit on the Burundi Conﬂict ). Moreover,
Nyerere characterised the sanctions as a signal of ‘support [for] a demo-
cratically elected government’ (Le Soir ..). Responding to this
challenge, the Buyoya government initiated its diplomatic campaign,
during which it became increasingly entrapped in its own strategy of
denouncing the sanctions as undermining the regime’s efforts to
negotiate.
To justify the takeover of power, Buyoya’s supporters argued that the
previous president’s ﬂight to the US embassy had created a power
vacuum, which left the stumbling nation without political leadership
in a deepening security crisis (Mworoha  int.). In such a situation,
Buyoya assumed his responsibility as an experienced statesman in a ‘pol-
itical change dictated by the events’ (Buyoya  int.) that was guided
by ‘humanitarian motives’ (Nijimbere  int.) and prevented a take-
over by Bagaza and other more extremist elements in the Tutsi commu-
nity. In short, the regime disputed that the takeover of power could be
characterised as a coup d’état, which would have potentially justiﬁed a
strong regional and international response, during this ‘denial phase’
(Risse : ). In contrast, FRODEBU stressed that the coup had
overthrown a democratically elected government (Misago  int.;
Nduwimana  int.). According to the party’s leading politicians
and diplomats, the region’s heads of state, who had applauded the
democratic  elections, could not accept military interference in
Burundi once again (Mbonerane  int.; Ntibantunganya  int.).
In a second phase, the Buyoya government then turned to criticising
the sanctions for undermining the true intentions behind the coup –
namely, to re-establish democracy and revive the peace process
(Longman : ). The regime responded to some of the senders’
demands in order to be able to argue that the sanctions were no
longer necessary. Conscious of the senders’ pressure, it reopened the
National Assembly and lifted the ban on political parties before the
ﬁrst review of economic sanctions in Arusha in mid-October 
(Mthembu-Salter ; Khadiagala ). Nonetheless, the political sig-
niﬁcance of these reinstated institutions remained extremely limited.
Political parties were only allowed under the vague requirement that
they ‘positively contribute to Burundi’s development’ (Economist
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Intelligence Unit ), which gave Buyoya the freedom to outlaw them
as he pleased. Moreover, the Assemblée Nationale lacked clearly deﬁned
legislative powers in the absence of the constitution, which had been sus-
pended after the coup (Hoskins et al. ).
In addition to responding to the senders’ demands to restore consti-
tutional rule, the regime stressed its willingness to engage in peace talks
(Buyoya : –). According to this discourse, the prolonged sanc-
tions undermined the government’s attempts to ﬁnd an internal sol-
ution to the crisis and ‘handicapped the negotiations’ (Girukwigomba
 int.). To prove the regime’s preparedness to advance a negotiated
settlement of the conﬂict, the government leaked information about
secret talks with the rebel movement CNDD under the mediation of
the Italian Catholic organisation Community of Sant’Egidio in Rome
at the end of  (Dupont ; Wolpe ) and circulated the
agenda, which included the restoration of the constitutional order, a
ceaseﬁre and the involvement of other political parties in the process
(Nijimbere ; Buyoya  int.). However, the talks subsequently
collapsed due to pressure from the Tutsi elites on the regime after the
information had been leaked.
Meanwhile, the former ruling party and the major opposition party
after the coup in Burundi, FRODEBU, repeatedly made reference to
the sanctions. This not only served as a constant reminder of the
regime’s illegal assumption of power (Bamvuginyumvira  int.)
but also legitimised and empowered FRODEBU’s claims vis-à-vis the gov-
ernment (for a similar theoretical argument, see Risse & Sikkink ).
Put differently, FRODEBU wanted to keep the sanctions in place
because they added authority to its demands (Ntibantunganya 
int.). The Hutu-dominated diaspora in Eastern Africa and Europe
enhanced these lobbying efforts by paying ofﬁcial delegation visits to
the European Commission, the European Parliament, the United
Nations and Western governments and by lobbying the public
(Ngendahayo  int.). In Germany, for instance, the so-called
Burundi Büro, ﬁnanced by the German non-proﬁt organisation
Aktion Courage, coordinated this work. Its Burundi news bulletin,
issued weekly, criticised the irregular nature of Buyoya’s rule and
emphasised the need for sustained international pressure, including
sanctions (Burundi Büro ). Major rebel groups such as the
CNDD-FDD also supported the sanctions as a means to constrain the
regime economically and militarily (Ndiho  int.).
In a third phase, initial concessions spurred further demands for pol-
itically more meaningful steps. Following a meeting of the Regional
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Initiative in Kampala on  August , Tanzanian foreign affairs min-
ister Jakaya Kikwete announced that the sanctions would remain in place
until they achieved their aim of fully restoring democratic rule in
Burundi (Inter Press Service ..). The government initiated a
National Debate, reﬂecting Buyoya’s preference for the domestic
peace processes (Brachet & Wolpe ). Such an internal political sol-
ution was meant to ease the regional pressure (Maundi : ). The
National Debate consisted of  presidential meetings and round tables
for representatives of the political parties, members of parliament,
public ofﬁcials, the army, the police and civilian groups. At the begin-
ning of , the internal debate led to the conclusion of a partnership
agreement that stipulated the enlargement of the National Assembly
from  to  members under a new constitution and the reshufﬂing
of the government, with FRODEBU’s Frédéric Bamvuginyumvira to
become prime minister (République du Burundi ). The regime
depicted this as further evidence that the Buyoya government was really
seeking to resolve the crisis through negotiations (Girukwigomba 
int.). In exchange, the partnership agreement stated that the sanctions
constituted an undeniable obstacle for the route towards peace and that
the transitional institutions should launch initiatives for the resumption
of bilateral and multilateral cooperation (République du Burundi ).
While FRODEBU’s internal wing thenceforth demanded the lifting of
sanctions, the external wing accused it of having become ‘Buyoya’s mar-
ginalised lapdog’ (Misago  int.). The  partnership hence man-
ifested the de facto split between the exiled faction of FRODEBU and
those who had remained in Burundi after the coup (International
Crisis Group ).
Having started negotiations and reinstated the political parties as well
as the National Assembly, the government claimed in  that it had
fulﬁlled the region’s conditions for lifting the sanctions (Mbonimpa
 int.). After the summit in Kampala on  February ,
however, the Regional Initiative stated that no signiﬁcant progress had
been achieved towards a peaceful settlement of the conﬂict, requested
unconditional negotiations including all rebel movements under the
mediation of Nyerere, and threatened to uphold the embargo otherwise
(IRIN ). After arguing more and more vocally that peace talks
with both Hutus and Tutsis were its key intention (New York Times
..; Dagne ), the Buyoya administration had increasing
difﬁculty justifying its reluctance to engage in the revitalisation of the
Arusha negotiations. By mid-, most parties to the conﬂict –
namely,  political parties and rebel movements – eventually
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embarked on the Arusha process, with the ﬁrst round of negotiations
taking place from  to  June . The process strove to ﬁnd a sol-
ution to the civil war and to lay the foundation for a transitional govern-
ment that would incorporate representatives of all the principal factions
(Lemarchand ). In January , the remaining trade restrictions
were ﬁnally lifted because the Burundi government had proved its irre-
vocable commitment to negotiations (Bentley & Southall ).
C O N C L U S I O N
The regional embargo in combination with the Western countries’
decision to freeze development assistance initially hit the small, land-
locked Burundi harshly. However, this ﬁnancial pain only led to limited
cooperation on the part of the sanctioned regime. It responded to the
demands to reopen the National Assembly and re-legalise political
parties, but it only endowed these bodies with a very restricted mandate.
In the meantime, the Buyoya government consolidated its grip on
power. Economically, earnings from blackmarket activities and the poten-
tial beneﬁts of sanction-busting activities were used to cater to patronage
networks. Politically, a successful campaign against the sanctions helped
the regime to regain some recognition among the international commu-
nity. However, this diplomatic campaign eventually backﬁred as Buyoya
became entrappedwithin this strategy of emphasising the regime’s willing-
ness to engage in peace talks. While the regime managed to address the
economic constraints posed by the sanctions to a considerable extent, its
campaign to ﬁght off challenges to its legitimacy – ampliﬁed by the sanc-
tions – in order to reengage important donors ultimately failed.
This shouldnot suggest that the regime’s argumentative self-entrapment
in its campaign against sanctions is sufﬁcient to explain the embargo’s
effectiveness. Clearly, the Arusha process also built upon preceding nego-
tiations (Maundi ). However, Buyoya’s willingness to participate in
unconditional, inclusive negotiations was initially limited. He stressed
both in public announcements and during private talks with Nyerere
that no negotiations would take place until the embargo was lifted
(Boyer ; Hoskins et al. : –). In addition to conditioning
peace talks on the lifting of sanctions, Buyoya atﬁrst ruled out negotiations
with the rebel movements and also sought to exclude them from the
national debate (IRIN b). Lastly and perhaps most importantly, ‘his
actual political decisions seem […] to be war-oriented’, as the Special
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Rapporteur for the UNCommission onHuman Rights put it in his second
report (UN Commission on Human Rights ).
Second, the conﬂict parties’ war weariness and a mutually painful sta-
lemate (Cunningham : ) contributed to the major political
initiative that occurred in mid-, even though the fact that neither
side was near victory had already been established in  (Economist
Intelligence Unit ) without prompting successful negotiations. In
addition, internal divisions within the Hutu and Tutsi camps had compli-
cated the peace process. As Buyoya faced intraparty resistance to nego-
tiating with FRODEBU from the military wing of UPRONA, he was only
willing to further engage in the peace process once he had established
himself domestically against this militant wing (Wolpe ). While
negotiations might have occurred one way or the other, the sanctions
forced the government to negotiate with more openness and according
to the conditions set by the Regional Initiative (Bihute  int.).
Going beyond the case of Burundi, this paper shows how the signals
sent by sanctions that delegitimise the targeted regime may become so
deeply ingrained in domestic controversies that they profoundly affect
political struggles, particularly how the incumbent regime and its
opponents position themselves vis-à-vis each other and the external coer-
cion. The predominant focus on the sanction’s ﬁnancial impact of past
research has tended to obscure the possibility that a state ‘may initiate
sanctions not simply to compel action on the part of the target, but to
communicate its preference, support allies, deter others from engaging
in similar activity, and dissuade the target from expanding its objection-
able activity’ (Kirshner : ). The embargo against Burundi hence
sheds light not only on how targeted regimes manage to withstand econ-
omic pressure from sanctions in the short run, but also on how cam-
paigns against sanctions – while initially helping the regime to sustain
its power – can force targeted regimes to grant major political conces-
sions if they start ‘talking the talk’ of sanction senders. In Burundi, the
former ruling party and main opposition party after the coup,
FRODEBU, continuously referred to the sanctions, which served as a
reminder of the Buyoya government’s irregular assumption of
power, in order to uphold pressure on the regime. The embargo
played such a key aspect in this strategy that FRODEBU launched a
pro-sanctions campaign (Ngendahayo  int.). How and under
which conditions sanctions effectively enable domestic opposition to
the sanctioned regime hence emerges as a crucial question that
merits further research.
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N O T E S
. In examining the domestic dynamics of contention in light of regional sanctions, this paper
focuses on FRODEBU as the main political opposition to Buyoya rather than on the civil war with
the rebel movements CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL, as the regional sanctions played a particu-
larly crucial role in the political struggle between FRODEBU and UPRONA/Buyoya.
. Unfortunately, many documents such as the relevant editions of FRODEBU’s party magazine
l’Aube de la Démocratie as well as the releases by the UPRONA-afﬁliated press agency Net Press, which
would be useful sources for reconstructing the discursive struggle about the embargo, were lost
during the civil war.
. There can be no doubt that the remaining trade restrictions still limited the economy’s room
to manoeuvre. The joint impact of the embargo and the civil war had signiﬁcantly reduced the coun-
try’s foreign exchange reserves and distorted the balance of payment (Banque de la République du
Burundi ). Nevertheless, the fact that the major donors indicated in  that they were willing
to resume aid to Burundi whether sanctions were lifted or not (Brandstetter : B) suggests
that the regime’s willingness to negotiate cannot be attributed only to the sanctions’ economic
pressure.
. The interviews were conducted in French. All quotes are translations by the author.
. In addition, Burundi has a weak tradition of associations (Vervisch & Titeca ), which
could have catalysed such protest.
. Therefore, Nyerere offered to stand down as mediator and had to be persuaded by the
Regional Initiative that his involvement continued to be of key importance if a negotiated settlement
was to be reached (Bunting et al. : –).
. While Belgium ofﬁcially endorsed the Regional Initiative, some high-ranking ofﬁcials were
highly critical regarding sanctions. However, the country as a whole reafﬁrmed its support for the
Nyerere-led initiative when it became clear that its ambiguity was sending mixed signals to the puts-
chist regime (Wolpe : –). In contrast to other European countries, Belgium’s approach to
Burundi was generally characterised by ‘positive instruments’ and incentives rather than condition-
ality (Gomes & Ferreira ).
. I discuss the regime’s response to the sanction’s economic impact and its argumentative self-
entrapment separately. While both developments are closely intertwined (as I show repeatedly), this
allows me to dig deeper into the somewhat different logics that occurred with respect to both
developments.
. Aktion Courage is an association with charitable status, supported ﬁnancially by the federal
German government and the European Union, which was established in  and promotes the
active participation of foreign nationals in Germany (http://www.aktioncourage.org/wir-ueber-
uns/).
. The Arusha negotiations were seriously handicapped because they excluded the major armed
adversaries of the regime, CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL.
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